Nietzsche's Philosophy as Indicator of Russian Identity
In the context of the Ukrainian conflict, an examination of contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche's ideas in Russia is necessary to comprehend (1) the ideological clash between Christian neoconservatives and ideologists of a "Eurasian imperial order" in Russia, and (2) the large-scale activities of ultranationalists aimed at establishing a new "Russian military philosophy."
For more than a century, the positive or negative attitude of Russian intellectuals toward Nietzsche has been an indication of Russia's pro-western or anti-Western perspective. The name Nietzsche can have good or bad implications depending on whether Russia views itself to be a part of Europe or a distinct non-European culture.
In the context of the discussion of the "Russia and the West" problem, Nietzsche's writings are unanimously interpreted by all participants in the discussion as a manifesto of European values. Depending on whether the search for a Russian identity is seen as a way to get closer to the West, as a pledge of Westernisation of Russia, or, conversely, as a basis for isolationism through the Russification and "nationalization" of non-European Russia, the name Nietzsche acquires positive or negative connotations.
The positive or negative attitude of the Russian intellectual elite to the ideas of the German philosopher has been an indicator of Russia's pro- or anti-Western course for over 130 years (from the end of the 19th century up to the present day).
In the beginning of the 2000-s there was the renaissance of Nietzschean philosophy in Russia, this period could be called the Silver Age of Russian Nietzscheanism. (The Golden Age of Nietzschean philosophy in Russia would be the first decade of the twentieth century.) The revival of interest in Nietzschean philosophy in Russia coincided with the country's entry into the world community as a European power.
From the 2010s until today there has been a period which I call the "crisis of Russian Nietzscheanism". The Russian national-patriotic opposition began to consolidate. Proponents of traditionalist, neo-fascist and national-communist theories have turned into supporters of anti-mondialism, anti-postmodernism and anti-globalization.
The Christian Neo-conservatives, who are currently engaged in the justification of a new Russian identity, advocate the transformation of Russia into an anti-Nietzschean "Eastern Christian civilization". Their criticism of Nietzsche has to do with the fact that for them Nietzsche is the creator of those very postclassical values of the modern Western European world that contradict the image of Europe par excellence, the eternally unattainable ideal of Europe that they dream of realizing in Russia, but which in fact exists only in a mythical past or a mythical future.
The ideologues of Dugin's "Third Way" (who compete with the Christian Neo-conservatives) and who abundantly quote Nietzsche's aphorisms taken out of context, see their goal in the formation of a "conservative-revolutionary pole of the Eurasian Imperial Order" in Russia – that is, a new way of developing Russia in opposition to Europe. Preparing for war with Ukraine in 2021, a far-right group tried to replace the academic leadership of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences with ideologues united around the media holding Tsargrad (such as Aleksander Dugin, Konstantin Malafeev, and Aleksander Boroday). They declared publicly that in the current critical phase of civilizational confrontation, the position taken by Russian philosophers towards the "hostile" Western world was no less important than the position taken by military officers towards the West. The Institute of Philosophy should be strategically equated with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The misinterpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy, from their point of view, was one of the main arguments in accusing the management committee of the Institute of Philosophy of a criminal research program.
The "Russian portrait" of Nietzsche at the beginning of the 21st century has not yet been written. A great deal of work lies ahead to rethink Nietzsche's legacy on both academic and popular levels, for example, to clear his name from associations with extreme right-wing Russian conservatism, ultra-nationalism and Eurasianism.
The positive or negative attitude of the Russian intellectual elite to the ideas of the German philosopher has been an indicator of Russia's pro- or anti-Western course for over 130 years (from the end of the 19th century up to the present day).
In the beginning of the 2000-s there was the renaissance of Nietzschean philosophy in Russia, this period could be called the Silver Age of Russian Nietzscheanism. (The Golden Age of Nietzschean philosophy in Russia would be the first decade of the twentieth century.) The revival of interest in Nietzschean philosophy in Russia coincided with the country's entry into the world community as a European power.
From the 2010s until today there has been a period which I call the "crisis of Russian Nietzscheanism". The Russian national-patriotic opposition began to consolidate. Proponents of traditionalist, neo-fascist and national-communist theories have turned into supporters of anti-mondialism, anti-postmodernism and anti-globalization.
The Christian Neo-conservatives, who are currently engaged in the justification of a new Russian identity, advocate the transformation of Russia into an anti-Nietzschean "Eastern Christian civilization". Their criticism of Nietzsche has to do with the fact that for them Nietzsche is the creator of those very postclassical values of the modern Western European world that contradict the image of Europe par excellence, the eternally unattainable ideal of Europe that they dream of realizing in Russia, but which in fact exists only in a mythical past or a mythical future.
The ideologues of Dugin's "Third Way" (who compete with the Christian Neo-conservatives) and who abundantly quote Nietzsche's aphorisms taken out of context, see their goal in the formation of a "conservative-revolutionary pole of the Eurasian Imperial Order" in Russia – that is, a new way of developing Russia in opposition to Europe. Preparing for war with Ukraine in 2021, a far-right group tried to replace the academic leadership of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences with ideologues united around the media holding Tsargrad (such as Aleksander Dugin, Konstantin Malafeev, and Aleksander Boroday). They declared publicly that in the current critical phase of civilizational confrontation, the position taken by Russian philosophers towards the "hostile" Western world was no less important than the position taken by military officers towards the West. The Institute of Philosophy should be strategically equated with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The misinterpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy, from their point of view, was one of the main arguments in accusing the management committee of the Institute of Philosophy of a criminal research program.
The "Russian portrait" of Nietzsche at the beginning of the 21st century has not yet been written. A great deal of work lies ahead to rethink Nietzsche's legacy on both academic and popular levels, for example, to clear his name from associations with extreme right-wing Russian conservatism, ultra-nationalism and Eurasianism.
In the context of the discussion of the "Russia and the West" problem, Nietzsche's writings are unanimously interpreted by all participants in the discussion as a manifesto of European values. Depending on whether the search for a Russian identity is seen as a way to get closer to the West, as a pledge of Westernisation of Russia, or, conversely, as a basis for isolationism through the Russification and "nationalization" of non-European Russia, the name Nietzsche acquires positive or negative connotations.
The positive or negative attitude of the Russian intellectual elite to the ideas of the German philosopher has been an indicator of Russia's pro- or anti-Western course for over 130 years (from the end of the 19th century up to the present day).
In the beginning of the 2000-s there was the renaissance of Nietzschean philosophy in Russia, this period could be called the Silver Age of Russian Nietzscheanism. (The Golden Age of Nietzschean philosophy in Russia would be the first decade of the twentieth century.) The revival of interest in Nietzschean philosophy in Russia coincided with the country's entry into the world community as a European power.
From the 2010s until today there has been a period which I call the “crisis of Russian Nietzscheanism”. The Russian national-patriotic opposition began to consolidate. Proponents of traditionalist, neo-fascist and national-communist theories have turned into supporters of anti-mondialism, anti-postmodernism and anti-globalization.
The Christian Neo-conservatives, who are currently engaged in the justification of a new Russian identity, advocate the transformation of Russia into an anti-Nietzschean “Eastern Christian civilization”. Their criticism of Nietzsche has to do with the fact that for them Nietzsche is the creator of those very postclassical values of the modern Western European world that contradict the image of Europe par excellence, the eternally unattainable ideal of Europe that they dream of realizing in Russia, but which in fact exists only in a mythical past or a mythical future.
The ideologues of Dugin's “Third Way” (who compete with the Christian Neo-conservatives) and who abundantly quote Nietzsche's aphorisms taken out of context, see their goal in the formation of a “conservative-revolutionary pole of the Eurasian Imperial Order” in Russia – that is, a new way of developing Russia in opposition to Europe. Preparing for war with Ukraine in 2021, a far-right group tried to replace the academic leadership of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences with ideologues united around the media holding Tsargrad (such as Aleksander Dugin, Konstantin Malafeev, and Aleksander Boroday). They declared publicly that in the current critical phase of civilizational confrontation, the position taken by Russian philosophers towards the “hostile” Western world was no less important than the position taken by military officers towards the West. The Institute of Philosophy should be strategically equated with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The misinterpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy, from their point of view, was one of the main arguments in accusing the management committee of the Institute of Philosophy of a criminal research program.
The "Russian portrait" of Nietzsche at the beginning of the 21st century has not yet been written. A great deal of work lies ahead to rethink Nietzsche's legacy on both academic and popular levels, for example, to clear his name from associations with extreme right-wing Russian conservatism, ultra-nationalism and Eurasianism.
The positive or negative attitude of the Russian intellectual elite to the ideas of the German philosopher has been an indicator of Russia's pro- or anti-Western course for over 130 years (from the end of the 19th century up to the present day).
In the beginning of the 2000-s there was the renaissance of Nietzschean philosophy in Russia, this period could be called the Silver Age of Russian Nietzscheanism. (The Golden Age of Nietzschean philosophy in Russia would be the first decade of the twentieth century.) The revival of interest in Nietzschean philosophy in Russia coincided with the country's entry into the world community as a European power.
From the 2010s until today there has been a period which I call the “crisis of Russian Nietzscheanism”. The Russian national-patriotic opposition began to consolidate. Proponents of traditionalist, neo-fascist and national-communist theories have turned into supporters of anti-mondialism, anti-postmodernism and anti-globalization.
The Christian Neo-conservatives, who are currently engaged in the justification of a new Russian identity, advocate the transformation of Russia into an anti-Nietzschean “Eastern Christian civilization”. Their criticism of Nietzsche has to do with the fact that for them Nietzsche is the creator of those very postclassical values of the modern Western European world that contradict the image of Europe par excellence, the eternally unattainable ideal of Europe that they dream of realizing in Russia, but which in fact exists only in a mythical past or a mythical future.
The ideologues of Dugin's “Third Way” (who compete with the Christian Neo-conservatives) and who abundantly quote Nietzsche's aphorisms taken out of context, see their goal in the formation of a “conservative-revolutionary pole of the Eurasian Imperial Order” in Russia – that is, a new way of developing Russia in opposition to Europe. Preparing for war with Ukraine in 2021, a far-right group tried to replace the academic leadership of the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences with ideologues united around the media holding Tsargrad (such as Aleksander Dugin, Konstantin Malafeev, and Aleksander Boroday). They declared publicly that in the current critical phase of civilizational confrontation, the position taken by Russian philosophers towards the “hostile” Western world was no less important than the position taken by military officers towards the West. The Institute of Philosophy should be strategically equated with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The misinterpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy, from their point of view, was one of the main arguments in accusing the management committee of the Institute of Philosophy of a criminal research program.
The "Russian portrait" of Nietzsche at the beginning of the 21st century has not yet been written. A great deal of work lies ahead to rethink Nietzsche's legacy on both academic and popular levels, for example, to clear his name from associations with extreme right-wing Russian conservatism, ultra-nationalism and Eurasianism.
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